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Acticon AG v. China North East Petroleum Holdings, Ltd.: How the Second Circuit Stood 
the Relevant Dura Interpretations on Their Heads 
 
John Arganbright
*
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 Is a securities fraud plaintiff precluded as a matter of law from sufficiently pleading 
economic loss and/or loss causation if she had the opportunity to sell her stock for a gain 
subsequent to a defendant-company’s corrective disclosure?1  Recently, in Acticon AG v. China 
North East Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., the Second Circuit answered in the negative, allowing 
plaintiffs who alleged securities fraud to progress past the pleading stage despite having the 
opportunity to sell their stock for a gain on several occasions.
2
  This decision abrogated three 
federal district court decisions within the Second Circuit,
3
 and stood in direct contrast to two 
federal district court decisions from outside the Second Circuit.
4
   
 Those five federal district courts relied principally on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, where the Court clarified the pleading standard for 
private securities actions.
5
  In Dura, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not sufficiently plead 
loss causation simply by alleging and then establishing that the stock price was inflated on the 
day of purchase due to misrepresentation; instead, the plaintiffs must prove that the 
                                                 
* Senior Articles Editor, Seton Hall Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A. 
Political Science, La Salle University, 2011. Many thanks to Chris Rojao, Brian Jacek, and professor Ron Riccio for 
their editorial assistance.  
1 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006) (establishing the pleading requirements for a private securities fraud action 
under SEC Rule 10b-5); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (listing the six elements necessary 
for a private securities fraud action pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et 
seq.). 
2 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2012).  
3 See In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Veeco 
Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007); 
Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005).  
4 See In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09-CV-2351-TWT, 2011 WL 384421, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011); 
Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009).  
5 544 U.S. at 347–48. 
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misrepresentation proximately caused their loss.
6
  Seemingly extending that principle, the five 
federal district courts held that when the stock in question returns to or eclipses its pre-disclosure 
price, the plaintiffs have not suffered any economic loss, and thus cannot sufficiently assert that 
the defendants’ alleged fraud proximately caused any loss.7  The Acticon decision, however, has 
called into doubt both the district courts’ interpretation of Dura and the future of private 
securities actions in which a stock price, despite allegations of fraud, subsequently rises above its 
purchase price after a corrective disclosure.  
 This Comment argues that the Second Circuit should have followed the district courts’ 
interpretation of Dura, both from a legal and logical standpoint.
8
  Specifically, Part II analyzes 
the relevant securities laws and the history of loss causation and economic loss.
9
  Part III looks at 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura, the five district court decisions interpreting its revised 
pleading standard for private securities fraud actions, and the Acticon decision.
10
  Part IV 
explains how the Second Circuit misinterpreted Dura, why the district courts’ interpretation is 
superior, what the Second Circuit should have done to extend Dura and the principles of the 
relevant securities laws, and the ramifications that will follow.
11
  Finally, this Comment 
concludes by recommending that the other federal appellate courts take an opposing 
interpretation of Dura, and by suggesting that the Supreme Court clarify the pleading standard 
for both economic loss and loss causation in private securities fraud cases.
12
  
 
                                                 
6 Id. at 344–47.  
7 See, e.g., Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43 (noting that  if a stock “could have been sold at a profit [after the close of 
the class period], the ‘actual economic loss’ contemplated in Dura is precluded.”), Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4 
(holding that “a price fluctuation without any realization of an economic loss is functionally equivalent to the 
Supreme Court's rejection of an artificially inflated purchase price alone as economic loss”).  
8 See infra Part IV.A. 
9 See infra Part II.  
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 See infra Part V.  
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PART II: THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LOSS AND LOSS CAUSATION IN SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS 
 Economic loss and loss causation in relation to securities fraud actions have a relatively 
short, complex history.  Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to 
regulate secondary markets after the Great Depression.
13
  Shortly thereafter, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), in furtherance of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, promulgated Rule 
10b-5, which generally made it unlawful to issue false or misleading statements in relation to the 
purchase or sale of securities.
14
  Since § 10(b) did not explicitly create a private cause of action 
for plaintiffs, and since the SEC did not define the contours of a 10b-5 action, interpretations of 
both  the statute and the Rule were left primarily to the courts, which have implied a private 
cause of action for an alleged 10b-5 violation since at least 1946.
15
 
 Additionally, since Rule 10b-5 is largely a judge-interpreted, judge-made device, the 
elements of such an action have developed over time.  Since at least 1974, however, courts have 
inferred loss causation as an element of a 10b-5 claim,
16
 interpreting it as a concept comparable 
to the doctrine of proximate cause in tort law.
17
  This judicial inference persisted until 1995, 
when Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which codified 
loss causation as an explicit element of a Rule 10b-5 claim.
18
   
Beyond just codifying the elements of a 10b-5 claim, the PSLRA, given the 
“uncertainties” of Rule 10b-5 and “conflicting legal standards,” also sought to curb abuses of the 
                                                 
13 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (West 2013).  
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2013); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975). 
15 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983) (citing Kardon v. Nat’l  
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) as the first court to imply a right of action for an alleged 10b-5 
violation).  
16 See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). 
17 See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-Based Securities Suits Post-
Dura Pharms., 36  SEC.  REG. L.J. 31,  33  (2008); see, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., 
Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (comparing loss causation to proximate cause), Castellano v. Young & 
Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) (same), Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 
1994) (same).  
18 Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000)).  
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securities laws.
19
  As a result, the Act heightened the pleading standard for securities fraud cases 
by forcing plaintiffs to plead certain elements with particularity.
20
  What is unclear, however, is 
whether either the PSLRA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a heightened pleading 
standard for loss causation—an issue that courts have addressed with varying conclusions.21 
 Next, although the PSLRA does not explicitly list economic loss as an element of a 10b-5 
action, the Supreme Court interpreted the securities laws to require plaintiffs to plead economic 
loss.
22
  In fact, in Dura, the Court listed the “basic elements” of a § 10(b) claim, and included 
both economic loss and loss causation.
23
  Moreover, although listed as independent elements, 
both economic loss and loss causation are often inextricably linked in a 10b-5 case, because a 
plaintiff must have suffered an economic loss before she can claim that the defendant’s alleged 
fraud is the proximate cause of that loss.
24
  To illustrate, the Supreme Court has said that loss 
causation “requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the 
market price also caused a subsequent economic loss,” linking the two elements into one 
analysis.
25
  Thus, for the purposes of this Comment, a court that determines that a plaintiff has 
failed to sufficiently plead economic loss is sufficiently analogous to another court holding that 
                                                 
19  S. REP. 104-98, at *4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, at 683–84 (1995); see also Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 
741 (noting that the potential for abuse of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures may be 
more likely in cases connected to the Exchange Act than other types of litigation). 
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006) (requiring a plaintiff to plead the requisite state of mind (‘scienter’) and 
‘misrepresentation’ with particularity).  
21 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
22 See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006) and including 
economic loss as one of the six elements of a 10b-5 claim).  
23 Id. at 341–42.  
24 Id. at 336 (holding that “[a]n inflated purchase price will not by itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant 
economic loss needed to allege and prove loss causation”) (emphasis added).  
25 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Lentell v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath 
Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 935, 935 (2005) (defining loss causation as “the 
causal link between the alleged misconduct and the economic [loss] ultimately suffered by the plaintiff”). 
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the plaintiff has failed to plead loss causation since she cannot show that she suffered an 
economic loss.
26
 
 
PART III: DURA AND THE FEDERAL COURTS’ SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS PRINCIPLES 
A.  Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 
 In Dura, the plaintiffs brought a 10b-5 case against Dura Pharmaceuticals (“Dura”), 
alleging that Dura made false statements concerning the expected Food and Drug Administration 
approval of a new asthmatic spray device, and that these false statements resulted in an 
artificially inflated stock price.
27
  The district court granted Dura’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding 
that the plaintiffs could not sufficiently plead a causal connection between the alleged 
misrepresentation and the plaintiffs’ economic loss.28  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded 
the case, positing that the plaintiffs could sufficiently plead loss causation merely by alleging 
that the security’s price was inflated at the time of purchase due to the misrepresentation.29  After 
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs could not sufficiently plead loss causation or “economic 
loss.”30  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer identified three areas where the Ninth 
Circuit erred: its interpretation of “fraud-on-the-market” cases,31 its lack of precedential 
support,
32
 and its oversight of important objectives of securities laws.
33
   
                                                 
26 Compare Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 44 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to set forth 
facts demonstrating actual economic damages within the context of loss causation as required by Dura”) (emphasis 
added) with In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(noting that the absence of economic loss “is sufficient grounds for dismissal [of the complaint]”) (emphasis added). 
27 Dura, 544 U.S. at 336.  
28 Id. at 340, In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 99CV0151-L(NLS), 2001 WL 35925887, at *10 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 2, 2001).  
29 Dura, 544 U.S. at 340; Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2003).  
30 Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–46.  
31 Id. at 342. 
32 Id. at 343–44. 
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First, the Ninth Circuit originally held that the plaintiffs need only prove that the stock 
price was inflated on the date of purchase due to the alleged misrepresentation,
34
 but the Court 
held that in a normal “fraud-on-the-market” case, such as this one, an inflated purchase price, 
alone, does not proximately cause economic loss.
35
  The Court concluded that “as a matter of 
pure logic,” a plaintiff does not suffer any loss at the time of the purchase, since “the inflated 
purchase price is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent value.”36  
Beyond that, the Court found that the logical link between an inflated purchase price and any 
subsequent economic loss was not conclusive, as the sale of stock at a lower price after a 
corrective disclosure “might mean a later loss.  But that is far from inevitably so.”37  In fact, the 
Court specifically noted that a lower price could reflect changing economic circumstances or 
investor expectations rather than a causal connection to the alleged misrepresentation.
38
 
Second, the Court pointed out that the Ninth Circuit’s central holding lacked precedential 
support, as private securities fraud actions usually resemble common law fraud actions, which 
require a plaintiff to show not only that she would not have acted had she known the truth, but 
that she actually suffered economic loss.
39
  Given the requirement that a plaintiff show actual 
damages, the Court found it unsurprising that other federal courts of appeals had both previously 
and subsequently rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach.40  The Court further noted that both the 
                                                                                                                                                             
33 Id. at 345. 
34 Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938 (emphasis in original). 
35 Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.  
36 Id. (emphasis in original).  
37 Id. (emphasis in original).  
38 Id. at 342–43 (also mentioning that “new industry-specific or firm-specific facts,” rather than the alleged fraud, 
could lead to the declining stock price).  
39 Id. at 343–44.  
40 Id. at 344; see, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that allegations of an inflated of purchase price alone could not satisfy pleading loss causation), 
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000) (same), Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 
1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (same).  
Page 7 of 30 
 
Restatement of Torts and other treatise writers had emphasized the need to prove, rather than 
merely assert, loss causation.
41
  
Finally, the Court declared that the Ninth Circuit’s holding contravened the purposes and 
principles of the federal securities laws, which, in the Court’s opinion, make private actions 
available “not to provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect 
them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”42  Again, the PSLRA 
requires plaintiffs to “specify” each misleading statement,43 plead certain elements with 
particularity,
44
 and carry the burden of proving that the defendants’ misrepresentations “caused 
the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover.”45  Given these statutory requirements, the Court 
concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s approach would “allow recovery where a misrepresentation 
leads to an inflated purchase price but nonetheless does not proximately cause any loss.  That is 
to say, it would permit recovery where . . . two traditional elements are missing.”46 
Due largely to these three concerns, the Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit, 
holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to state a claim for relief.47  Importantly, 
however, the Court left two issues undecided: what types of specific facts a 10b-5 plaintiff must 
produce in order to sufficiently plead loss causation,
48
 and whether a heightened pleading 
standard, pursuant to the PSLRA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to loss 
                                                 
41 Dura, 544 U.S. at 344–45; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §548A cmt. b, at 107 (1978), W. KEETON, D. 
DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 110, p. 767 (5th ed. 1984).  
42 Dura, 544 U.S. at 345; cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., joined by O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]llowing recovery in the face of affirmative evidence of nonreliance-
would effectively convert Rule 10b-5 into a scheme of investor's insurance. There is no support in the Securities 
Exchange Act, the Rule, or our cases for such a result.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006).  
44 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).  
46 Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.  
47 Id. at 342–46.  
48 Id. at 346 (declining to address separate proximate cause or loss-causation arguments).  
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causation.
49
  These two issues have resulted in varying interpretations of Dura in the lower 
federal courts, culminating in the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Acticon.50 
B.  Post-Dura Cases Involving Economic Loss and Loss Causation 
 Although the Dura Court left the two aforementioned issues unresolved or unclear, 
various federal district courts—including the district court decision that Acticon reversed51—
have interpreted Dura’s principles and framework in the same fashion—one diametrically 
opposed to the Second Circuit’s interpretation. 
1.  Malin v. XL Capital Ltd. 
Decided just a few months after Dura, Malin was the first case to interpret and apply 
Dura to a situation where the allegedly inflated stock price almost or fully recovered subsequent 
to a corrective disclosure.
52
  In Malin, the plaintiffs alleged a Rule 10b-5 violation, asserting that 
the defendants issued false and misleading statements concerning the company’s financial 
circumstances, leading to an inflated share price that fell after subsequent disclosures.
53
  
Furthermore, in an attempt to distinguish Dura, the plaintiffs suggested that not only was there 
an inflated price, but that the price drop was causally related to the subsequent disclosure.
54
   
In response, however, the defendants presented evidence that the share prices fully 
recovered just a few months after the class period ended.
55
  With that in mind, the court posited 
that the defendants’ evidence negated the plaintiffs’ inference that there was a causal connection 
                                                 
49 Id. (assuming, for argument’s sake, that the securities statutes do not impose a heightened pleading standard, but 
noting that the plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient under either a Rule 8 or Rule 9 analysis).  
50 See infra Part III.C. 
51 See generally In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
52 See generally Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 
2005). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at *3.  
55 Id. at *4.  
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between the misleading statements and the price drop.
56
  In its central holding, the Malin court 
ruled that “a price fluctuation without any realization of an economic loss is functionally 
equivalent to [Dura’s] rejection of an artificially inflated purchase price alone as economic loss. 
If the current value is commensurate to the purchase prices, there is no loss, regardless of 
whether the purchase price was artificially inflated.”57  As a result, the court granted the 
defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the amended complaint.58 
2.  In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation 
 In In re Veeco, the lead plaintiff and defendants presented the court with several motions 
in limine concerning alleged misrepresentations in Veeco’s press releases.59  In the defendants’ 
motion to preclude the lead plaintiff’s damages expert from offering certain calculations as to 
potential damages, the defendants first asked the court to prevent the expert from arguing that the 
damages provision of the PSLRA was a means of measuring actual damages.
60
  In the 
defendants’ estimations, the PSLRA provided a cap on damages, rather than a measure of 
damages.
61
  The court agreed, holding that § 21(D) of the PSLRA imposed a cap on the damages 
available to plaintiffs, rather than measuring the amount of damages.
62
  
 Second, the defendants argued that the expert should not be allowed to take into account 
damages for any shares sold after the corrective disclosure at a price equal to or higher than the 
allegedly inflated share price.
63
  Again, the court agreed with the defendants, noting that the 
plaintiff’s damages expert also agreed when he stated in his expert report that “[i]f either the 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (emphasis added).  
58 Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4.  
59 See generally In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695 (CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007). 
60 Id. at *6.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
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inflation or price increased over the holding period for any particular share, the share was not 
damaged, so the damage for that share is zero.”64 
 Finally, the defendants asked the court to preclude expert testimony regarding any 
damages for the then unsold shares that were purchased prior to the corrective disclosure.
65
  The 
court first noted that neither the PSLRA nor Dura imposed a “sell to sue” requirement,66 but then 
reasoned that, under Dura, a plaintiff must nevertheless still prove that he or she suffered an 
economic loss.
67
  In that regard, the court directly relied on the Malin court’s interpretation of 
Dura that a plaintiff holding stock that was commensurate to its purchase price suffered no 
damages, even if the purchase price was artificially inflated.
68
  Thus, the court held that 
“[p]laintiffs who chose to retain their shares past the point when the stock price first recovered 
[to its purchase price] can prove no economic loss that is attributable to any of the defendants’ 
alleged misrepresentations.”69  Significantly, the court further noted that this analysis was in 
accord with the lead plaintiff’s own damages expert’s conclusion that a plaintiff suffers no 
damages if a share price increases over the holding period.
70
  As a result, the court ultimately 
granted the defendant’s motion in limine to prevent the plaintiff’s damages expert from 
portraying the damages provisions of the PSLRA as a means of calculating damages rather than 
as a cap on damages.
71
 
3.  Ross v. Walton 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 In re Veeco, 2007 WL 7630569, at *7.  
66 The “sell to sue” theory requires that the plaintiff must have sold the allegedly inflated stock in order to bring a 
securities fraud action.  
67 In re Veeco, 2007 WL 7630569, at *7.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at *7, *9.  
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In this 2009 case, the plaintiffs purchased Allied Capital stock over a fifteen month 
period before Allied made a corrective disclosure that caused the stock price to drop from $33 at 
the beginning of January 10, 2007, to $31.58 at the end of the day, to $27.79 at the opening on 
January 11.
72
  Additionally, in the ninety days that followed, Allied’s stock never closed at a 
price above $32.
73
  Consequently, the plaintiffs sought damages pursuant to the Exchange Act 
and the PSLRA.
74
   
While the defendants conceded that there is no “sell to sue” rule, they instead presented 
evidence that the stock was trading at a profit one month before the plaintiffs filed their amended 
complaint.
75
  Therefore, the defendants relied on Malin’s “commensurate value” holding, 
arguing that the plaintiffs should be precluded from pleading loss causation.
76
  In this case, the 
court found the Malin reasoning instructive, as, similar to the plaintiffs in Malin, the plaintiffs 
here argued that they need only allege that a misrepresentation caused a facially plausible price 
drop.
77
  The Ross court disagreed with the plaintiffs, noting that it was “unaware of any authority 
in which actual economic loss was found when the stock value returned to pre-disclosure prices 
and could have been sold at a profit just after the class period.”78  In fact, the court acknowledged 
that it was undisputed that the plaintiffs could have sold their stock for a profit on at least three 
occasions in June 2007, a few months after the plaintiffs had filed their complaint.
79
  Thus, while 
the court agreed that there was no “sell to sue” rule, it concluded that Malin’s interpretation of  
Dura was correct, in that Dura’s rationale precludes a plaintiff from pleading “actual economic 
                                                 
72 Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35, 41 (D.D.C. 2009).  
73 Id. at 41.  
74 Id. at 35.  
75 Id. at 42.  
76 Id. at 42; see Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 
2005). 
77 Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43.  
78 Id. at 43.  
79 Id. 
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loss” if the stock could have been sold for a profit after the corrective disclosure.80  The court 
further asserted that, “[l]ogically, a plaintiff can not demonstrate the amount the purchaser 
overpaid if the stock value rose greater than the purchase price on multiple occasions.”81 
Finally, the court noted that since a § 10(b) claim involves fraud, the plaintiffs must, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),
82
 plead the circumstances giving rise to fraud 
with particularity.
83
  Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs could have sold their shares for a profit on 
various occasions after filing their complaint, the court found that “even under the Rule 8(a)(2) 
‘facially plausible’ standard, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate economic loss beyond a simple 
fluctuation in value or, at best, an artificially inflated purchase price, specifically rejected by 
Dura.”84  As a result, the court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion since it concluded 
that the fact that the plaintiffs could have sold their stock for a gain precluded them from 
pleading loss as a matter of law.
85
 
4. In re Immucor, Inc. Securities Litigation 
In this motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff claimed that the court erroneously 
dismissed its claim that Immucor violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act by making false and 
misleading statements with regard to its compliance with FDA regulations.
86
  In its initial order, 
the court posited that the plaintiff was precluded from pleading economic loss and loss causation 
since Immucor’s share price “quickly rebounded” to pre-disclosure levels after each corrective 
disclosure.
87
  The plaintiff argued that the court’s conclusion was a “clear error of law,” but the 
court, asserting its reliance on the persuasive authority of both Ross and Malin—where the stock 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
83 Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
84 Id. at 43. 
85 Id. 
86 In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09 CV 2351 TWT, 2011 WL 3844221, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011).  
87 Id. at *2. 
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prices reached or eclipsed the plaintiffs’ purchase prices—denied the plaintiff’s motion for 
reconsideration.
88
  Specifically, even though the plaintiff tried to distinguish this case from Ross 
and Malin, the court held that, “given the many factors that can affect share price, contrasting the 
price immediately before the corrective disclosure . . . and the price shortly thereafter provides 
the most relevant comparison for evaluating whether the stock price dropped significantly 
following the corrective disclosure and whether the disclosure caused the drop in price.”89  As a 
result, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FDA-related securities fraud claims due to the 
plaintiff’s inability to plead actual economic loss or loss causation.90 
5.  In re China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Securities Litigation 
In In re China North East, the lead plaintiff, Acticon, purchased approximately sixty 
thousand shares of China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. (“NEP”) over the course of five 
months—January 2010 to May 2010.91  Ultimately, Acticon spent $434,950 for those sixty 
thousand shares, resulting in an average price of $7.25 per share.
92
  Following those purchases, 
NEP subsequently made multiple corrective disclosures to its financial statements from prior 
years, leading Acticon to file suit against NEP for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
93
  NEP 
issued its final corrective disclosure on September 1, 2010,
94
 but NEP stock closed above $7.25 
on twelve separate days between October and November 2010.
95
  Seizing on that fact, the district 
court determined that because the plaintiffs could have sold their shares for a profit on multiple 
                                                 
88 Id. at *3.  
89 Id. at *2. The court’s language seems to imply that Immucor’s stock never fully recovered to its pre-disclosure 
price, but the court had previously said that the stock did “quickly rebound to pre-disclosure levels after each of the 
FDA-related disclosures,” id. 
90 Id. at *1.  
91 In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
92 Id.  
93 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2012).  
94 In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
95 Id. 
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occasions following the corrective disclosures, Dura’s principles—and Malin’s persuasive 
interpretation of those principles—precluded the plaintiffs from pleading economic loss.96 
Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that they should be able to sue based on the losses 
suffered from the sales of stock they made between December 2010 and May 2011.
97
  In 
response, the court recognized that the plaintiffs had suffered a loss, but ultimately held that the 
plaintiffs could not impute their loss to any of NEP’s alleged misrepresentations.98  To that end, 
the court posited that “[a] plaintiff who forgoes a chance to sell at a profit following a corrective 
disclosure cannot logically ascribe a later loss to devaluation caused by the disclosure.”99  Thus, 
the court granted the defendant’s three motions to dismiss the consolidated complaint, becoming 
the fifth district court—out of five—to interpret Dura as precluding pleading loss 
causation/economic loss when the stock price had approached or eclipsed the purchase price 
subsequent to a corrective disclosure.
100
   
C.  Primary Case: Acticon AG v. China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. 
 After the In re China plaintiffs appealed, the Second Circuit, in a matter of first 
impression, reversed the district court, holding that the plaintiffs were not precluded as a matter 
of law from pleading economic loss just because the stock price had risen higher than the 
investors’ average purchase price subsequent to the corrective disclosures.101  Specifically, the 
Second Circuit noted that the district court’s limitation on damages was inconsistent with both 
the “out of pocket” measure of damages traditionally used in § 10(b) actions and with the 
“bounce back” damages cap in the PSLRA.102   
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 354.  
101 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2012). 
102 Id. at 39.  
Page 15 of 30 
 
 First, the Second Circuit observed that the “out of pocket” measure of damages has 
traditionally been used to determine economic loss in § 10(b) cases.
103
  Under that measure, “‘a 
defrauded buyer of securities is entitled to recover only the excess of what he paid over the value 
of what he got.’”104  Moreover, the Second Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court has adopted 
the “out of pocket” measure of damages, defining it as the difference between the fair value of 
the plaintiff’s purchase and the fair value of what the plaintiff would have received absent the 
fraud. 
105
  As a result, the Second Circuit determined that the district court erred by failing to 
apply the “out of pocket” method of damages, asserting that, aside from the “bounce back” 
provision in the PSLRA, Congress had not otherwise altered the traditional method for 
calculating damages.
106
 
 The Second Circuit further held that the district court’s conclusion was inconsistent with 
the PSLRA’s “bounce back” provision, which caps the amount of damages a plaintiff can receive 
in a securities fraud action.
107
  Under that provision, a plaintiff’s damages cannot exceed the 
difference between the plaintiff’s purchase price of the security and the security’s average 
trading price in the ninety days following the final corrective disclosure.
108
  Thus, the Second 
Circuit concluded that Acticon would have only been precluded from pleading loss under the 
PSLRA if NEP’s average trading price over the ninety days following the last corrective 
disclosure would have exceeded the plaintiffs’ purchase price.109 
                                                 
103 Id. at 38.  
104 Id. (quoting Levine v. Seilon, 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971)).  
105 Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).  
106 Id. at 39.  
107 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2006).  
108 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38–39; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1).  
109 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39 (citing In re Mago Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
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 In addition to these two apparent inconsistencies, the Second Circuit determined that the 
Malin line of reasoning—on which the trial court below relied—incorrectly interpreted Dura.110  
According to the Second Circuit, those interpretations erroneously used as their starting point the 
Court’s observation that “at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no 
loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses 
equivalent value.”111  After reiterating that Dura did not affect the traditional “out of pocket” 
measure of damages, the Second Circuit posited that “a share of stock that has regained its value 
after a period of decline is not functionally equivalent to an inflated share that has never lost 
value . . . [because] it assumes that if there are any intervening losses, they can be offset by 
intervening gains.”112   
To that end, NEP argued that the security price recovery indicated that the market was 
unaffected by the corrective disclosures, and that the disclosures were thus unconnected to the 
plaintiffs’ claimed losses.113  The Second Circuit disagreed, however, and found that this 
argument spoke to the merits of the issue.
114
  Rather, the Second Circuit determined that the 
plaintiffs here, unlike the plaintiffs in Dura, had alleged more than an artificially inflated price—
they had alleged that NEP’s stock dropped as a result of the corrective disclosures.115  Thus, 
since the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs were not precluded from pleading economic 
loss as a matter of law, it reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for NEP.116   
 
PART IV: ANALYSIS OF HOW THE ACTICON DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE AND 
PRINCIPLES OF DURA 
                                                 
110 Id. at 40–41.  
111 Id. (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005)).  
112 Id. at 41.  
113 Id. at 39–40.  
114 Id. at 40.  
115 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40.  
116 Id. at 41–42.  
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 After five federal district courts had uniformly interpreted Dura as precluding a plaintiff 
from pleading economic loss and/or loss causation when a security price recovers following a 
corrective disclosure, the Second Circuit’s Acticon decision turned that interpretation on its head, 
concluding the exact opposite, and creating confusion for both courts and commentators.  This 
Comment argues that the district courts’ interpretation was superior as a matter of legal 
interpretation and in relation to the goals and principles of securities laws.  Finally, this 
Comment also considers the consequences of the Second Circuit’s decision moving forward. 
A. The Second Circuit Misinterpreted and Misapplied Supreme Court Jurisprudence in 
Acticon 
 In its rejection of the district courts’ interpretation of Dura, the Second Circuit took 
umbrage with those courts’ damages analysis, essentially concluding that they had used the 
wrong starting point, and/or had flat-out misapplied the applicable measure of damages.
117
   
Specifically, the Second Circuit’s assertion that the “out of pocket” measure of damages is 
traditionally used for § 10(b) cases is problematic for two reasons.  First, even if one accepted 
this proposition, loss causation would still be an issue.
118
  Second, one could reasonably argue 
that the present case is distinguishable because it presents the unusual circumstances where the 
stock price appears to have been unaffected—or the market unconcerned—despite allegations of 
fraud.  
                                                 
117 Id. at 38–41 (analyzing the “traditional out of pocket” measure of damages for §10(b) cases, and concluding that 
the Malin court’s interpretation of Dura was inconsistent with that measure).  
118 In fairness, the district court below based its holding on the premise that the plaintiffs could not plead economic 
loss as a matter of law, so the Second Circuit limited its holding to the same element. Theoretically, however, the 
district court, on remand, could determine that even though the plaintiffs were not precluded from pleading 
economic loss as a matter of law, that they had not sufficiently shown that the defendants’ corrective disclosures 
were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ “loss.” See supra Part II (linking the elements of economic loss and loss 
causation, and determining that a plaintiff must essentially prove that she has suffered a loss before showing that the 
defendant’s actions proximately caused that loss).  
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 Furthermore, even the Second Circuit’s reliance on the “out of pocket” measure of 
damages is questionable.  For example, the Acticon court asserted that the Supreme Court had 
“adopted the ‘out-of-pocket’ measure of damages” in Affiliated Ute,119 but Affiliated Ute is 
readily distinguishable from Acticon, as the former primarily concerned the misstatement of a 
material fact in fraudulently-induced sales of stock in relation to Rule 10b-5 and the Ute Indian 
Supervision Termination Act.
120
  Additionally, the Supreme Court language on which the Second 
Circuit relied in Acticon concerned damages under § 28 of the Exchange Act, not § 10(b).
121
  
Finally, in the plaintiffs’ brief to the Supreme Court in Dura, they specifically quoted Affiliated 
Ute and its conclusion that the measure of damages should be “the difference between the fair 
value of all that the . . . seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had 
there been no fraudulent conduct.”122  Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly address this 
contention in Dura, the Court did hold for the defendants, which should be interpreted as the 
Court implicitly considering and rejecting this argument and its assessment of the supposedly 
relevant measure of damages.
123
  In that vein, if the Supreme Court was not persuaded by this 
argument in Dura, then this suggests that it would find this argument—and the Second Circuit’s 
reliance on it—unpersuasive in the present, admittedly different, securities fraud case.  
 Furthermore, the Second Circuit posited that the district courts’—specifically, the Malin 
court’s—reasoning was inconsistent with the “out of pocket” measure of damages and the 
PSLRA’s “bounce back” provision.124  To that end, in the Acticon court’s estimation, the Malin 
court erroneously took as its starting point Dura’s observation that “at the moment the 
                                                 
119 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38 (citing Affiliated Ute Citzens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).  
120 25 U.S.C. §§ 677–677aa; Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 128–33.  
121 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155).  
122 Respondents’ Brief at *12–19, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 
2004 WL 2671450 (quoting Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154–55).  
123 Dura, 544 U.S. at 344, 347–48.  
124 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39.  
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transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss[, as] the inflated purchase payment is 
offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possess equivalent value.”125  In support of its 
own interpretation of the PSLRA and the relevant measure of damages, the Second Circuit noted 
that “a share of stock that has regained its value after a period of decline is not functionally 
equivalent to an inflated share that has never lost value . . . [because] [i]n the absence of fraud, 
the plaintiff would have purchased the security at an uninflated price and would have also 
benefitted from the unrelated gain in stock price.”126  This interpretation, while ostensibly 
logical, seems to have been foreclosed by Dura when the Court held that 
[w]hen the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, that lower 
price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, 
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts. . . . The same 
is true in respect to a claim that a share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise 
have been.
127
   
 
Echoing that sentiment and standing in accord with the Supreme Court, the SEC—the 
agency that promulgated Rule 10b-5—has asserted that, under these circumstances, a plaintiff 
does not suffer any loss at the time of purchase since she can immediately sell the shares without 
a loss.
128
  In light of these assertions, not only does the Second Circuit’s logic seem 
unconvincing—and possibly foreclosed—but the district courts’ analysis seems superior since it 
extends the principles of both Dura and the SEC.   
 As a result, the reasoning in a case like Ross v. Walton should have been more persuasive 
to the Second Circuit.  Read broadly, Ross is fairly analogous to Acticon—the plaintiffs had a 
chance to sell their securities for a profit after the class period ended but elected not to.
129
  In 
                                                 
125 Id. at 40–41 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 342).  
126 Id. at 41.  
127 Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–43 (emphasis added).  
128 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *21–22, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564.  
129 Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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Ross, the court held that “if the stock’s value was commensurate to the pre-disclosure trading 
price after the close of the class period [and] could have been sold at a profit, the ‘actual 
economic loss’ contemplated in Dura is precluded.”130   
The Ross court further noted that even if there was “loss”—the issue in Acticon—Dura 
still requires a plaintiff to show that it was the corrective disclosure and not “one of the [other] 
‘tangle of factors’ that affect[ed] price.”131  The Ross court then summarized its analysis by 
concluding that “[l]ogically, a plaintiff can not demonstrate the amount the purchaser overpaid if 
the stock value rose greater than the purchase price on multiple occasions.”132  Thus, these 
assertions mesh with and extend Dura’s conclusion that the securities fraud statutes are not 
meant to “provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect them 
against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”133  In this respect, and as 
an integral part of this overarching debate, the Court’s reasoning was based on economic loss, so 
it seems logical that a prospective gain would extend the Court’s analysis and yield no remedy 
for the plaintiffs in Acticon.
134
  
 Additionally, the Second Circuit should have given more credence—if it paid any 
attention at all—to the plaintiff’s damages expert in In re Veeco.135  In that case, the plaintiff’s 
damages expert concluded that “[i]f either the inflation or price increased over the holding period 
for any particular share, that share was not damaged, so the damage for that share is zero.”136  As 
a result, the court ultimately concluded that any “[p]laintiffs who chose to retain their shares past 
the point when the stock price first recovered to the value at which the shares were purchased, 
                                                 
130 Id. at 43.  
131 Id.  
132 Id. 
133 Dura, 544 U.S. at 345.  
134 See id. 
135 See In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *6–7 
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007).  
136 Id. at *6.  
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can prove no economic loss that is attributable to any of the defendants' alleged 
misrepresentations”—a conclusion that the In re Veeco court noted comported with the damages 
expert’s deductions.137 
 Furthermore, the Acticon decision seems to stand in contrast to the Court’s attempt to 
narrow Rule 10b-5 in Dura.  Specifically, the Court seemed to err on the side of preventing valid 
suits instead of allowing invalid suits.
138
  Additionally, “[b]y attempting to prevent ‘largely’ 
groundless suits along with completely groundless suits . . . the Supreme Court appears to 
provide courts guidance to error on the side of dismissing suits with [tenuous causal 
connections],”139 an issue that certainly comes into play when a security’s price becomes 
commensurate to a plaintiff’s purchase price after the end of the class period.  
 Finally, the Acticon court noted, as part of its conclusion, that it was not aware of any 
federal appellate court or Supreme Court cases that had applied Malin’s interpretation of Dura 
and the securities fraud laws to cases where a stock price reached or exceeded a plaintiff’s 
purchase price subsequent to a corrective disclosure.
140
  This observation seems overstated, 
however, as there does not appear to be any federal appellate court or Supreme Court cases that 
have adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning when applied to an analogous situation.  In fact, this 
was an issue of first impression for the Second Circuit
141—which includes Wall Street within its 
jurisdiction—so the lack of support for Malin’s reasoning at the federal appellate levels should 
                                                 
137 Id. at *7.  
138 Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-Based Securities Suits Post-
Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 48 (Spring 2008), available at 
http://hayboo.com/files/Publication/e19c0362-4e02-4672-b469-
23791b644cfd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7f515f2d-d66c-442b-8582-
280bf1b53360/Pleading%2520and%2520Proving%2520Loss%2520Causation%2520in%2520Fraud-On-The-
Market_Based%2520Securities%2520Suits%2520Po.pdf. 
139 Id. at 62.  
140 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 2012).  
141 Reed Smith Client Alert, Second Circuit Holds that Stock Price Rebound after Disclosure of Fraud Does Not 
Negate Inference of Economic Loss at Pleading Stage of Securities Fraud Suit (Aug. 23, 2012), available at  
http://www.reedsmith.com/Second-Circuit-Holds-that-Stock-Price-Rebound-after-Disclosure-of-Fraud-Does-Not-
Negate-Inference-of-Economic-Loss-at-Pleading-Stage-of-Securities-Fraud-Suit-08-23-2012/. 
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be neither dispositive nor persuasive.  Regardless, for the aforementioned reasons, the Second 
Circuit has arguably misinterpreted Dura and the relevant securities laws, and the district courts’ 
analyses of Dura are superior.   
B.  The Second Circuit Could Have Exacted a Heightened Pleading Standard on the 
Plaintiffs for Proving Economic Loss and/or Could Have Constructed Loss Causation 
Under the PSLRA Differently 
 Even if the Second Circuit found the district courts’ interpretation of Dura unpersuasive, 
the Acticon court could have still ruled for the defendants in two ways.  First, the court could 
have required the plaintiffs to plead economic loss and loss causation consistent with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Next, the Second Circuit could have construed the term “loss 
causation” for 10b-5 claims consistently with the PSLRA’s definition of loss causation for § 
12(a) claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities Act”). This section analyzes how 
both of determinations could have affected the outcome of Acticon. 
1.  Heightened Pleading Standard for Economic Loss/Loss Causation 
At the outset, the Second Circuit acknowledged in Acticon that “[a]fter Dura, it is unclear 
whether the plaintiffs must satisfy the ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ standard 
demanded by Rule 8(a)(2) or the more stringent heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) 
in pleading economic loss.”142  The court then recognized that it could not find any federal 
circuit court decisions that addressed heightened pleading for economic loss, but that it had 
found a few decisions pertaining to the standard for loss causation.
143
  Specifically, the Second 
Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit had imposed a heightened pleading standard for loss 
causation, the Fifth Circuit had not, and the Ninth Circuit had found it unnecessary to decide in a 
                                                 
142 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 37–38.  
143 Id. at 38. 
Page 23 of 30 
 
relevant case.
144
  As a result, the court held that “[b]ecause we find that the price fluctuations 
here would not rebut an inference of economic loss under either standard, we, like the Ninth 
Circuit, find it unnecessary to resolve this issue at this time.”145 
While the consequences of punting on the heightened pleading standard issue are 
analyzed in greater depth infra,
146
 the Second Circuit could have—and perhaps should have—
adopted a heightened pleading standard for proving economic loss and loss causation, a 
determination that would have changed the outcome of the case.  
The first issue is whether the PSLRA itself requires a heightened pleading standard for 
these elements. This argument can be dismissed, as the PSLRA explicitly provides that a plaintiff 
must “state with particularity” the facts surrounding both a material misstatement or omission 
and state of mind.
147
  Thus, one would reasonably expect that if Congress intended to exact a 
heightened pleading standard for economic loss and/or loss causation, that it would have done so 
in the statute. 
Whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure necessitate a heightened pleading standard, 
however, is another matter.  For example, in Ross v. Walton, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause a 
claim under § 10(b) involves fraud, [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b) requires plaintiffs to 
plead ‘the circumstances constituting fraud’ with particularity.”148  This reasoning is persuasive 
for a few reasons.  First, before the PSLRA codified the elements of a § 10(b) claim, those 
private actions largely resembled common law fraud cases.
149
  Second, as part of a plaintiff’s 
                                                 
144 Id. (citations omitted).  
145 Id.  
146 See infra Part IV.C. 
147 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A) (2006). 
148 Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2009). 
149 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (“In general, the case law developed in this Court with 
respect to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been based on doctrines with which we, as judges, are familiar: common-law 
doctrines of fraud and deceit.”). 
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prima facie case, a plaintiff must still plead scienter—a staple of common law fraud cases150—
with particularity.
151
  In that respect, it seems logical to determine that because § 10(b) claims 
sound in fraud, both traditionally and currently, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would 
require heightened pleading.  In fact, this logic is both persuasive and seems to comport with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence given the weight that the Court gave to the similarities between 
common law fraud and § 10(b) cases in Dura.
152
 
 Alternatively, in Katyle v. Penn National Gaming, Inc., the Fourth Circuit posited some 
compelling reasons for why the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demand a heightened pleading 
standard for loss causation.
153
  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit cited Supreme Court precedent, 
which noted that “[p]rior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a complaint for 
securities fraud was governed not by [the general pleading standard of] Rule 8, but by the 
heightened pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b).”154  Now, since the PSLRA explicitly 
provides for a heightened pleading standard for a few elements, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
the statute supersedes Rule 9(b) in those regards.
155
 Since the PSLRA was silent as to the rest of 
the elements, however, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the statute does not affect past Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, meaning that Rule 9(b) still applies to those elements.
156
 
 In Dura, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify how the PSLRA affected the 
requisite pleading standard for pleading loss causation, but the Court opted not to, since it 
determined that the plaintiffs could neither satisfy the pleading standard under Federal Rule of 
                                                 
150 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that 
common law fraud cases typically require proof of scienter).  
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
152 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–45 (2005).  
153 637 F.3d 462, 471–72, n.5 (4th Cir. 2011).  
154 Id. at n.5 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007)). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
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Civil Procedure 8 nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9.
157
  Given that deduction, the Court 
assumed, “for argument’s sake, that neither the Rules nor the securities statutes impose any 
special further requirement in respect to the pleading of proximate causation or economic 
loss.”158  Nevertheless, absent further Supreme Court clarification, the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation—decided six years after Dura—seems the most reasonable.  As a result, the 
Second Circuit, although under no obligation to accept the Fourth Circuit’s logic, would have 
been justified if it had adopted a similar view.  
2.  An Alternative Construction of the PSLRA Could Have Defeated the Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint in Acticon 
 Although it is unclear whether the defendants in Acticon raised the following argument, 
the defendants could have prevailed on an alternative interpretation of the PSLRA and its 
definition of “loss causation.”  The Second Circuit’s decision in Acticon is premised on 
economic loss grounds, but, again, for the purposes of this Comment, the two elements go hand-
in-hand, as even if a plaintiff can prove that she suffered an economic loss, she must also show 
that the defendant’s alleged fraud was the proximate cause of that loss.159 
 As to that alternative interpretation, in the petitioner-defendants’ brief to the Supreme 
Court in Dura, they argued that, under the principle of uniformity, the Court should apply the 
PSLRA’s definition of loss causation in § 105, which amended and applied to § 12(a)(2) cases 
under the Securities Act,
160
 consistently with the term “loss causation” used in Rule 10b-5 
cases.
161
  Currently, the difference is that § 105 of the PSLRA provides an affirmative defense to 
                                                 
157 Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.  
158 Id. (emphasis added). 
159 See supra Part II.  
160 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (West 2013).  
161 Brief for Petitioners at *18–21, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 
2075752. 
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§ 12(a)(2) cases if the defendant can prove lack of loss causation.
162
  Under § 105 of the PSLRA, 
§ 12 plaintiffs cannot recover damages if the defendant “proves that any . . . or all of the 
[recoverable] amount . . . represents [something] other than the depreciation in value of the 
subject security resulting from [the alleged material misstatements or omissions].”163  If this 
definition of loss causation was applied to § 10(b) claims as well, then a defendant could defeat a 
Rule 10b-5 claim by showing that the security price subsequent to the end of the class period was 
commensurate to a plaintiff’s purchase price. Although the Supreme Court did not address this 
argument in Dura, the SEC appears to support this construction, as it, in its amicus brief to the 
Court, reasoned that the PSLRA’s definition of loss causation should be consistent for both § 
10(b) cases under the Exchange Act and § 12 cases under the Securities Act.
164
 
 Even if the defendants in Acticon did not raise this argument, the Second Circuit could 
have considered it as part of their overall analysis of the PSLRA.  Regardless, this interpretation, 
which is seemingly supported by the SEC, could be used in the future to defeat the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation and to uphold the five district courts’ rulings.  
C. The Consequences of the Acticon Decision 
 In Acticon, the Second Circuit ultimately determined that “[b]ecause we find that the 
price fluctuations here would not rebut an inference of economic loss under either standard, we, 
like the Ninth Circuit, find it unnecessary to resolve this issue at this time.”165  This Comment 
previously discussed why the Second Circuit could or should have adopted a pleading standard 
for economic loss and loss causation that was consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                                 
162 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (West 2013).  
163 Id. 
164 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *25–26, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564.  
165 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).  
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9(b),
166
 but absent such a proclamation, the Second Circuit’s decision to abstain from deciding 
the issue is also problematic for two reasons.  First, the Second Circuit’s conclusion that the price 
fluctuations would not have rebutted an inference of economic loss is questionable, and second, 
its decision to punt on the issue, theoretically, leaves the decision up to the district courts within 
the Second Circuit.  
 By failing to specify a standard, however, one can envision the tension that would arise if 
a district court within the Second Circuit determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
applied to a case analogous to Acticon, and thus concluded that the plaintiff had failed to 
sufficiently plead economic loss or loss causation.  In this scenario, the district court—perhaps 
relying on logic similar to that of the Fourth Circuit in Katyle—would likely be revesred by the 
Second Circuit, based on Acticon.
167
  Thus, one could reasonably argue that the Second Circuit, 
by passing on the issue, impliedly supported the less stringent pleading standard—the 
consequences of which suggest a more plaintiff-friendly approach to 10b-5 cases within the 
Second Circuit.  
 Next, the Second Circuit held that Acticon had satisfied the pleading requirements set 
forth in Dura since it had “alleged something more than the mere fact that it purchased NEP 
shares at an inflated price; specifically, it allege[d] that the price of NEP stock dropped after the 
alleged fraud became known.”168  This conclusion seems partly premised on the PSLRA’s 
“bounce back” provision and the average stock price over the ninety days following the final 
corrective disclosure, but since the “bounce back” provision is a damages cap, this deduction is 
questionable for a few reasons.   
                                                 
166 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
167 See generally Acticon, 692 F.3d 34.  
168 Id. at 40.  
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First, it begs the question of whether the Second Circuit would find that a plaintiff had 
met the pleading standard for a § 10(b) claim if the security price rose immediately after the 
corrective disclosure—as in, for example, the very next day after a corrective disclosure. If that 
were the case—that an immediate gain would break any causal link between the alleged fraud 
and any “loss”—then how immediately must the gain occur?  In Acticon, NEP’s stock eclipsed 
the plaintiffs’ purchase price on twelve different occasions, with the first instance occurring as 
soon as a month after the final corrective disclosure.
169
  Following that logic, it seems that a 
plaintiff could reasonably plead a § 10(b) claim so long as the stock price did not immediately 
rise after a corrective disclosure.  If this analysis overextends the Second Circuit’s logic, 
however, then the alternative view seems to be an arbitrary determination of how long after a 
corrective disclosure a stock price can recover before it falls outside of Acticon’s holding—one 
week? two weeks? seemingly not one month, though, or NEP would have prevailed.
170
 
 Next, the Second Circuit was persuaded because the plaintiffs had alleged “something 
more” than the Dura plaintiffs, who had merely claimed an inflated stock price;171 namely, the 
plaintiffs in Acticon had alleged that “the price of NEP stock dropped after the alleged fraud 
became known.”172  As a result, this seems to suggest that any plaintiff who can both claim that 
she purchased securities at an artificially inflated price and can point to evidence that the stock 
price dropped after a corrective disclosure has met the pleading standards.  By this logic, though, 
it seems too easy for plaintiffs to meet the pleading standard in an analogous § 10(b) case.  To 
illustrate, while publicly traded companies may occasionally have to issue corrective disclosures, 
                                                 
169 In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
170 See id. 
171 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40.  
172 Id. 
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not all of them will be pursuant to nefarious actions by the company.
173
  Under a broad 
interpretation of the Second Circuit’s holding, however, all a plaintiff has to do—assuming all 
other 10b-5 elements are equal—is show that there was both a corrective disclosure and an 
immediate drop in the stock price.  But the problem is that the security in question might have 
dropped on that particular day for reasons completely unrelated to the corrective disclosure; for 
example, poor earnings in the relevant quarter from a properly filed form, industry-wide news 
affecting all relevant stock prices, or the potential merger of the company-in-question’s two 
biggest competitors.  As it now stands, however, a corrective disclosure coupled with a drop in 
stock price seems sufficient to plead economic loss and/or loss causation under Acticon.
174
  
While satisfying the pleading standard in the federal court system is not meant to be an arduous 
task,
175
 Acticon’s holding may inevitably lead to more frivolous lawsuits—the very thing that 
Congress designed the PSLRA to prevent.
176
  Additionally, most 10b-5 cases that pass the 
pleading stage are likely to settle,
177
 since, beyond that point, it is probably more cost-effective 
                                                 
173 See Michael Coffino & Marc Goldich, To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Public Company Strategies in Packaging 
Corrective Disclosures in Press Releases (2008), available at 
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/2008/07/articles/forums/to-bundle-or-not-to-bundle-public-company-strategies-in-
packaging-corrective-disclosures-in-press-releases/ (arguing that viewing “corrective disclosures in a vacuum can 
precipitate a rush to judgment by potential class action plaintiffs or their lawyers . . . to launch a securities fraud 
class action”).  
174 See Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40–41.  
175 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 
(2007)) (noting that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible [e.g. not “probable”] on its face’”).  
176 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 308 (2007) (noting that the PSLRA was designed 
to be “a check against abusive litigation in private securities fraud actions”).  
177 See Thomas F. Gillespie III, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: A Missed Opportunity to Right the Wrongs in 
the PSLRA and Rebalance the Private Rule 10b-5 Litigation Playing Field, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 161, 174 (2008), 
available at 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:8qzGRSCUuUMJ:www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/jbtl/i
ssues/3_1/3_1_161_Gillespie.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiZ-
CLpseVDzbGPkZ3J0WLAXDAihMeUtnGSwpH_MdSHDLJa5OowRd8dxUFo59fDX6lpQqH33RXJcbyaiZ6G_Nt
B5S2DdiL6HrbwpPBvqGKbCSQJ6J6VFbzcvrfwLxapNuH7Q-
bj&sig=AHIEtbS3KIMzZwNUBjdrBUpEiah5N0ayww (remarking that the pleading stage of 10b-5 cases is so 
important because “so few, if any, Rule 10b-5 cases go to trial”).  
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for the defendant to pay out—even if it has done nothing wrong—rather than engage in what 
would likely be an expensive discovery process.  
PART V: CONCLUSION 
 Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s decision causes a lot of uncertainty.  The five federal 
district court cases that have addressed this issue have all interpreted Dura and the relevant 
securities fraud statutes in a similar way, bringing some clarity to the issue.  With its holding, the 
Second Circuit—which, admittedly, is under no obligation to accept the district courts’ logic or 
holdings—has created confusion in this area of the law, and has given future defendants one less 
arrow in their quiver with which to defeat these claims before proceeding to the costly stage of 
discovery.  Moving forward, it will be interesting to see if federal district and appellate courts 
outside of the Second Circuit follow this logic—this Comment argues that they should not—and 
if district courts within the Second Circuit attempt to distinguish future cases from Acticon in 
order to grant future defendants’ motions to dismiss.  Regardless, the Supreme Court should 
clarify a few of the main issues from Acticon soon—specifically, whether Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8 or 9 applies to economic loss and loss causation, and, more importantly, whether a 
plaintiff is or is not precluded as a matter of law from pleading economic loss or loss causation 
when her stock price becomes commensurate to her purchase price following a corrective 
disclosure. 
